Deklarasi Balfour: Perbedaan antara revisi

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Perdana Menteri Yunani mengemukakan kepada editor Pro-Israel, surat kabar Yahudi Salonica, bahwa "pembentukan sebuah Negara Yahudi disambut dengan rasa simpati yang dalam dan tulus di Yunani ... Palestina yang Yahudiah akan menjadi sekutu Yunani."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} Di [[Swiss]], sejumlah sejarawan ternama, termasuk Profesor Tobler, Profesor Forel-Yvorne, dan profesor Rogaz, mendukung gagasan pembentukan sebuah Negara Yahudi. Salah seorang di antaranya bahkan mengemukakan bahwa pembentukan sebuah Negara Yahudi adalah "hak suci orang Yahudi."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} Di [[Jerman]], para pejabat dan sebagian besar media massa mengartikan Deklarasi Balfour sebagai usaha pembentukan sebuah negara yang disponsori Inggris bagi orang Yahudi.{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}}
 
Pemerintah Inggris, termasuk Churchill, memberi penjelasan bahwa isi Deklarasi Balfour tidak bermaksud bahwa seluruh wilayah Palestina harus diubah menjadi Kediaman Nasional Yahudi, "melainkan bahwa Kediaman semacam itu harus didirikan di Palestina."{{efn|group=lower-roman|Ketika ditanya pada tahun 1922 mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan pengembangan Kediaman Nasional Yahudi di Palestina, Churchill menjawab, "kiranya dapat dijawab bahwa hal itu bukanlah pemaksaan kebangsaan Yahudi atas penduduk Palestina secara keseluruhan, melainkan pengembangan lebih lanjut dari komunitas Yahudi yang sudah ada ... supaya kediaman itu dapat menjadi sebuah pusat, yang dapat menjadi pokok kepedulian kebanggaan orang Yahudi secara keseluruhan atas dasar agama dan ras... that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance... that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed."<ref>Gilbert, Martin. ''Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship'', Macmillan (2007) p. 74, taken from Churchill's letter of 1 March 1922</ref>{{efn|group=lower-roman|Churchill's letter to T.E. Lawrence added, "It is manifestly right that the Jews who are scattered all over the world should have a national centre and a national home where some of them may be reunited. And where else could that be but in the land of Palestine, with which for more than three thousand years they have been intimately and profoundly associated?"<ref name=Wallace>Wallace, Cynthia D. ''Foundations of the International Legal Rights of the Jewish People and the State of Israel'', Creation House, (2012) pp. 72-73</ref>}}}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Col. [[T.E. Lawrence]] ("Lawrence of Arabia,") in a letter to Churchill on 17 January 1921, wrote that [[Faisal I of Iraq|Emir Faisal]], the eldest son of [[Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca|King Hussein]], "had agreed to abandon all claims of his father to Palestine" in return for Arab sovereignty in Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Syria.Friedman refers to this letter as being from Lawrence to Marsh (Churchill's private secretary) states that the date of 17 January is erroneous ("a slip of the pen, or a misprint") and claims that the most likely date is 17 February. Friedman as well refers to an undated ("presumably 17 February") letter from Lawrence to Churchill that does not contain this statement.{{sfn|Friedman|2017|p=277}}Paris references only the Marsh letter and while claiming the evidence is unclear, suggests that the letter may have described a meeting that took place shortly after 8 January at [[Edward Turnour, 6th Earl Winterton|Edward Turnour, Earl Winterton]]'s country house.{{sfn|Paris|2003|p=129}}
Faisal's biographer discusses an acrimonious meeting which took place on 20 January 1921 between Faisal, Haddad, Haidar and Lindsey, Young and [[Kinahan Cornwallis]] and says that this meeting led to a misunderstanding that would later be used against Faisal as Churchill later claimed in parliament that Faisal had acknowledged that the territory of Palestine was specifically excluded from the promises of support for an independent Arab Kingdom. Allawi says that the minutes of the meeting show only that Faisal accepted that this could be the British government interpretation of the exchanges without necessarily agreeing with them.{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=323}}In parliament, Churchill in 1922 confirmed this, "..a conversation held in the Foreign Office on the 20th January, 1921, more than five years after the conclusion of the correspondence on which the claim was based. On that occasion the point of view of His Majesty's Government was explained to the Emir, who expressed himself as prepared to accept the statement that it had been the intention of His Majesty's Government to exclude Palestine."<ref>[[Hansard]], [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1922/jul/11/pledges-to-arabs]: HC Deb 11 July 1922 vol 156 cc1032-5</ref>}}<!-- [[Faisal I of Iraq|Emir Faisal]], King of Syria and Iraq, made a formal written agreement with Sionis leader [[Chaim Weizmann]], which was drafted by T.E. Lawrence, whereby they would try to establish a peaceful relationship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.<ref name=Sekulow>Sekulow, Jay. ''Unholy Alliance: The Agenda Iran, Russia, and Jihadists Share for Conquering the World'', Simon and Schuster (2016) pp. 29-30</ref> The 3 January 1919 [[Faisal–Weizmann Agreement]] was a short-lived agreement for Arab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.{{efn|group=qt|[[Ali Allawi]] explained this as follows: "When Faisal left the meeting with Weizmann to explain his actions to his advisers who were in a nearby suite of offices at the Carlton Hotel, he was met with expressions of shock and disbelief. How could he sign a document that was written by a foreigner in favour of another foreigner in English in a language of which he knew nothing? Faisal replied to his advisers as recorded in [[Awni Abd al-Hadi|'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi's]] memoirs, "You are right to be surprised that I signed such an agreement written in English. But I warrant you that your surprise will disappear when I tell you that I did not sign the agreement before I stipulated in writing that my agreement to sign it was conditional on the acceptance by the British government of a previous note that I had presented to the Foreign Office… [This note] contained the demand for the independence of the Arab lands in Asia, starting from a line that begins in the north at Alexandretta-Diyarbakir and reaching the Indian Ocean in the south. And Palestine, as you know, is within these boundaries… I confirmed in this agreement before signing that I am not responsible for the implementation of anything in the agreement if any modification to my note is allowed""{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=189}}}} Faisal did treat Palestine differently in his presentation to the Peace Conference on 6 February 1919 saying "Palestine, for its universal character, [should be] left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties concerned".{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=92}}<ref>{{cite wikisource |title=Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6 February 1919, at 3 p.m. |wslink=Arab Memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference |author=[[United States Department of State|United States. Dept. of State]] |year=1919 |publisher=Foreign Relations of the United States – Peace Conference |volume=3 |pp=889, 890, 892}}</ref> The agreement was never implemented.{{efn|group=qt|Although it was noted by [[United Nations Special Committee on Palestine|UNSCOP]] that "To many observers at the time, conclusion of the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement promised well for the future co-operation of Arab and Jew in Palestine."{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 122}} and further referring to the 1937 report of the Palestine Royal Commission which noted that "Not once since 1919 had any Arab leader said that co-operation with the Jews was even possible" despite expressed hopes to the contrary by British and Sionis representatives.{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=78}}}} In a subsequent letter written in English by Lawrence for Faisal's signature, he explained:
{{quote|We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, suffering similar oppression at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step toward the attainment of their national ideals together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Sionis movement...We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.<ref name=Sekulow/>}}When the letter was tabled at the [[Shaw Commission]] in 1929, [[Rustam Haidar]] spoke to Faisal in Baghdad and cabled that Faisal had "no recollection that he wrote anything of the sort".{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} In January 1930, Haidar wrote to a newspaper in Baghdad that Faisal: "finds it exceedingly strange that such a matter is attributed to him as he at no time would consider allowing any foreign nation to share in an Arab country".{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} [[Awni Abd al-Hadi]], Faisal's secretary, wrote in his memoirs that he was not aware that a meeting between Frankfurter and Faisal took place and that: "I believe that this letter, assuming that it is authentic, was written by Lawrence, and that Lawrence signed it in English on behalf of Faisal. I believe this letter is part of the false claims made by Chaim Weizmann and Lawrence to lead astray public opinion."{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} According to Allawi, the most likely explanation for the Frankfurter letter is that a meeting took place, a letter was drafted in English by Lawrence, but that its "contents were not entirely made clear to Faisal. He then may or may not have been induced to sign it", since it ran counter to Faisal's other public and private statements at the time.{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=216-217}} A 1 March interview by Le Matin quoted Faisal as saying: