Álvaro Uribe Vélez: Perbedaan antara revisi
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|otherparty = [[Partai LIberal Kolombia]]
|spouse = Lina María Moreno Mejía
|children = Tomás Uribe Moreno<
|alma_mater = [[Universitas Antioquia]]<br />[[Universitas Harvard]]<br />[[St Antony's College, Oxford]]
|profession = [[Pengacara]]
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'''Álvaro Uribe Vélez''' ({{lahirmati|[[Medellín]], [[Kolombia]]|4|7|1952}}) adalah Presiden [[Kolombia]] (sejak [[2002]]). Ia adalah seorang [[pengacara]] dari Universitas Antioquia dengan spesialisasi Administrasi dan Manajemen dari [[Universitas Harvard]]. Ia menikah dengan Lina Moreno de Uribe dan ayah dua anak, yaitu Tomás and Jerónimo.
== Kisah Hidup dan Pendidikan ==
Álvaro Uribe adalah anak pertama dari lima bersaudara yang dilahirkan dari keluarga Alberto Uribe Sierra dan Laura Vélez. Ibunya pernah menjadi anggota dewan dan ayahnya seorang tuan tanah kaya dan pemilik peternakan sapi. Pada usia 10 tahun, keluarganya pindah dari peternakan Salgar mereka ke [[Medellín]]. Ia belajar di sekolah-sekolah yang dikelola oleh Ordo [[Yesuit]] dan [[Benediktin]]. Ia lulus pada [[1970]] dari Institut Jorge Robledo yang bergengsi. Prestasi akademiknya membuat ia dibebaskan dari semua ujian akhir pada dua tahun terakhirnya sekolahnya.
Uribe kemudian belajar di [[Universitas Antioquia]], dan mendapatkan gelar sarjana hukum pada [[1977]]. Ia menjadi anggota sayap "Pemuda Liberal" dari [[Partai Liberal Kolombia]]. Ia dianugerahi [[beasiswa]] karena prestasinya yang sangat baik ketika di universitas.
Pada [[1993]] ia menyelesaikan pendidikan spesialisasinya dalam bidang Administrasi dan Manajemen di [[Universitas Harvard]]. Di universitas itu pun ia mengikuti kuliah penyelesaian konflik.
Dari [[1998]] hingga [[2000]] ia menjadi anggota student di [[St Antony's College]], [[Universitas Oxford]] di [[Inggris]], dengan beasiswa [[Simón Bolívar]] dari [[British Council]].
== Kehidupan Politik ==
Pada [[1976]] Uribe menjadi Kepala aset untuk Perusahaan Negara Medellín ([[Empresas Públicas de Medellín]]). Ketika [[Alfonso López Michelsen]], menjadi presiden, ia memegang jabatan sebagai Sekretaris Jenderal Departemen Perburuhan sejak [[1977]] hingga [[1978]]. Pada saat itu ia menikah.
Presiden [[Julio César Turbay Ayala]] mengangkatnya sebagai direktur Penerbangan Sipil dari [[1980]] hingga [[1982]].
Ia melepaskan posisinya ini untuk menjadi [[Wali kota]] [[Medellín]] pada [[1982]], yang didudukinya selama lima bulan. Pada saat itu ia dipromosikan ke dalam sejumlah jabatan publik. Karena itu ia kemudian melepaskan jabatannya sebagai wali kota. Para kritikus menganggap hal itu disebabkan karena dukungan Uribe terhadap sekurang-kurangnya dua proyek masyarakat yang besar (proyek pembangunan perumahan besar-besaran untuk kaum miskin Medellín dan kampanye penghijauan) yang diresmikan oleh [[Pablo Escobar]], pada saat ketika raja narkoba itu sedang berusaha menarik simpati publik.
Ayah Uribe dibunuh oleh para [[gerilya]] [[Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusioner Kolombia|FARC]] dalam usaya penculikan pada [[1983]]. Setelah kematiannya, Álvaro Uribe menyingkirkan sebagian besar dari propertinya di pedesaan dan memusatkan perhatiannya pada karier politiknya sebagai anggota [[Partai Liberal Kolombia]].
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=== Senator Antioquia ===
Uribe terpilih sebagai salah seorang [[senator]] Antioquia antara [[1986]] dan [[1990]], dan kembali terpilih antara [[1990]] dan [[1994]].
Sebagai senator ia menjabat ketua Komisi Tujuh dan ia mendukung hukum yang berkaitan dengan: pembaruan pensiun, pembaruan hukum perburuhan, promosi karier administratif, pembiayaan demokratis terhadap klub-klub [[sepak bola]], pembaruan [[jaminan sosial]], promosi sistem perbankan koperasi, pembentukan dana bantuan untuk para guru, produksi gula hitam, dan perlindungan atas kaum perempuan sebagai kepala keluarga.
Belakangan sebagian dari undang-undang ini dikritik, khususnya UU No. 50/1990 dan UU No. 100/1993, yang memungkinkan kelenturan yang lebih tinggi dari pasaran tenaga kerja dan privatisasi dan pemasalan jaminan sosial. Banyak pengamat di kemudian hari menganggap semua UU ini tidak memadai atau pada akhirnya kontra produktif terhadap perburuhan dan pelayanan kesehatan di Kolombia, sehingga upaya-upaya pembaruan selanjutnya perlu dilakukan.
Selama masa jabatannya yang belakangan ia mendapatkan penghargaan resmi dan tak resmi yang menganggapnya sebagai salah satu dari "senator terbaik" ([[1990]], [[1992]] dan [[1993]]) dan sebagai senator dengan "inisiatif perundang-undangan terbaik" ([[1992]]).
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Uribe terpilih sebagai [[gubernur]] dari ''departemen'' Antioquia untuk masa jabatan [[1995]] hingga [[1997]].
Pada masa ini ia mempraktikkan apa yang disebutnya sebagai model untuk suatu negara [[komunitarian]], yang secara teoretis terdiri atas partisipasi warga yang aktif dalam proses pengambilan keputusan pemerintah. Model ini dinyatakan bermanfaat untuk menghasilkan perbaikan dalam sistem tenaga kerja, pendidikan, transparansi administratif dan keamanan masyarakat.<!--
The results of his governorship would include, according to statistics provided by the governor's office and contemporary analysts, a 34% reduction of the department's [[bureaucracy]] and 35% of the vehicles in official use. 102.000 new school slots were created by contracting private schools and 40.000 people were trained in peaceful conflict negotiation. It is claimed that 1.200.000 poor people entered into the subsidized health system, that 939 km of roads were paved (which would allegedly be more than half of the total road distance paved in Antioquia to that date), that available telephone lines were also doubled and an increasing number of school scholarships were awarded. He is also credited with a 60% reduction in kidnappings, providing safety to the roads connecting Medellín and the capital of [[Bogotá]] and with slashing numerous expenses that allowed for administrative savings.
In his jurisdiction, governor Uribe openly supported a national program of cooperative neighborhood watch groups that become known as CONVIVIR, which had been created by a [[February 11]] [[1994]] decree of Colombia's Ministry of Defense. The CONVIVIR groups quickly became controversial.
Reports argued that some achieved results in providing security to communities and intelligence coordination to military forces, but apparently numerous members committed abuses against civilians, without a serious oversight over their operations and organization. In [[1998]], [[Human Rights Watch]] stated that "we have received credible information that indicated that the CONVIVIR groups of the Middle Magdalena and of the southern Cesar regions were directed by known paramilitaries and had threatened to assassinate Colombians that were considered as guerrilla sympathizers or which rejected joining the cooperative groups". [http://www.hrw.org/spanish/inf_anual/1998/colombia.html]
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After four years of failed attempts by the previous administration, under [[Andrés Pastrana Arango|Andrés Pastrana]] to negotiate a ceasefire amid decreasing public support for the peace process and the guerrillas, electoral analysts considered that public mood had shifted.
Until at least a year before the election, polls showed that no more than 2% of the electorate contemplated voting for Álvaro Uribe and in fact the Liberal Party's [[Horacio Serpa]] was the probable winner, but this trend began to change as the peace process degenerated, resulting in the perception of Uribe as the candidate that could potentially provide a viable security program in order to face the country's insurgencies. Former General [[Harold Bedoya Pizarro]], a candidate with a superficially similar program, remained marginalized.
Uribe's electoral platform was centered around the policy of confronting Colombia's main guerrilla movement, the FARC. Other relevant propositions included slashing the national administration's expenses, fighting corruption and proposing a national referendum to resolve several of the country's political and economical concerns.
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==Presiden 2002-2006==
As president, polls (usually based on a random sample of income-classified telephone numbers but others also including door-to-door interviews) have consistently shown what would be an unprecedented level of support by many Colombians (estimated at around 70% after his second year in office).[http://semana.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/articulo.html?id=82687]
Uribe's relative popularity, widespread according to polls but highest among the medium and higher income sectors of society, is largely considered to be due to his administration's relatively successful campaigns against the FARC and the ELN, and in part to the efforts made to begin demobilizing the paramilitaries ([[Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia|AUC]]). Another aspect of this phenomenon that has been pointed out by analysts concerns the generalized perception of Uribe as a [[charisma]]tic 24-hour [[workaholic]] and as a promoter of personal and administrative [[austerity]], which has been interpreted by some as a role model for other Colombians and politicians.
Uribe and members of his cabinet travel outside of Bogotá during the weekends and, as part of the [[communitarian]] state model that he has implemented, organize weekly communitarian councils in every department, including remote regions of the national territory. These sessions are televised live through national television on one of the state's public channels for several hours. The stated objective of these councils is to promote citizen participation and exchange direct feedback with local authorities, publicly hearing and discussing their different concerns.
It is widely thought among his supporters that these councils have contributed to varying degrees of advancement in the resolution of local issues by simplifying "red tape" and are credited with keeping Uribe's popularity levels, reinforcing his image of a hardworking, plain-speaking politician. His sympathizers consider he has achieved significant results in the fight against illegal armed groups, that his efforts have allowed civilian traffic to return to many Colombian roads that had been abandoned during the 1990s, and that he has tried to implement macroeconomic measures that would stimulate internal commerce, growth and reduce unemployment.
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===Keamanan Publik===
Uribe's declared priority has been to contain or defeat the three main armed groups in Colombia, the AUC, ELN, and FARC, and military operations launched against all three groups have increased in intensity since he took office, especially against FARC. In [[November 7]], [[2004]], Colombian military intelligence intercepted a message from FARC leaders calling for all its guerilla units to try to assassinate him.
Uribe has stated that the government must first show military superiority in order to eventually make the guerrillas return to the negotiating table with a more flexible position, even if this would only happen after his term in office expired. He has been quoted as saying that Colombia's main concerns at the moment are the challenges of terrorism and the narcotics trade[http://www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/agosto/22/17222003.htm] and "Of course we need to eliminate social injustice in Colombia but what is first? Peace". [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4021213.stm]
His security program is based on the application of what has been termed as a policy of [[democratic security]], with the defined objectives of:
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#reducing homicide levels
#preventing forced displacement and facilitating the return of forcefully-displaced people
#continuing to fight the illegal drug trade through interdiction, eradication and judicial action.
The policy intends to achieve these goals through:
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Many analysts tend to accept that there have been some factual improvements in the areas of security (for the most part) and human rights (to a lesser degree), but they also question the exact validity and application of some of the statements, pointing out serious problems, in particular (but not only) paramilitary related, which remain a source of grave concern.
In January [[2005]], [[Human Rights Watch]] expressed the policy's apparent inability to adequately address the following issues: "Paramilitary groups maintain close ties with a number of Colombian military units. The Uribe administration has yet to take effective action to break these ties by investigating and prosecuting high-ranking members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have collaborated with paramilitary groups. Credible reports indicate that some of the territories from which the military has ejected the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia, FARC) are now under the control of paramilitary groups, which continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population." [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/colomb9847.htm]
A February [[2005]] report from the [[United Nations]]'s [[High Commissioner for Human Rights]] on the year [[2004]] stated: "Achievements and advances were observed in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law; however, there were also difficulties and contradictions...Progress was recorded in terms of prevention and protection, including strengthening of the mechanism of community defenders and the early warning system, as well as regarding the Ministry of the Interior’s programmes for the protection of vulnerable groups. Weaknesses persisted in the Government’s responses to warnings, as well as in decreasing risk factors for vulnerable groups. The Government adopted positive measures regarding the destruction of stored anti-personnel mines. The armed forces occasionally carried out operations in which they failed to observe humanitarian principles." [http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informes.php3?cod=8&cat=11]
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===Hubungan Internasional===
Since gaining office, Uribe's concrete actions would tend to show him as a stringent enemy of narcotics traffickers, as his administration has been responsible for arresting and extraditing more drug traffickers to the [[United States]] and to other countries than all other presidents to date.
He has also been publicly recognized as a supporter of the United States in the [[war on terror]] (supporting the invasion of Iraq despite internal opinions to the contrary) and in the [[war on drugs]], through the continued implementation of the anti-drug strategy of [[Plan Colombia]].
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Several analysts consider that, being a relative ally of the [[United States]], he would be ideologically opposed to leftwing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. Despite these ideological differences, Uribe has participated in multilateral meetings and has held bilateral summits with presidents [[Hugo Chávez]], [[Martín Torrijos]], [[Lula da Silva]], [[Ricardo Lagos]], [[Carlos Mesa]] and [[Vicente Fox]], among others. Colombia has also maintained diplomatic relations with [[Cuba]] and the [[People's Republic of China]].
There have been some diplomatic incidents and crises between Venezuela and Colombia during his term, in particular around the [[2005]] [[Rodrigo Granda affair]], Colombia's frustrated [[2004]] acquisition of 46 [[AMX-30]] tanks from [[Spain]] and an [[Alleged planned Venezuelan coup in 2004]] by alleged Colombian paramilitaries. These internationally worrying circumstances have been ultimately resolved through the use of official diplomatic channels and bilateral presidential summits (in the first two cases).
International law enforcement cooperation has been maintained with countries such as the [[United States]], [[Spain]], the [[United Kingdom]], [[México]], [[Ecuador]], [[Venezuela]], [[Peru]], [[Panama]], [[Paraguay]], [[Honduras]] and [[Brasil]] among others.
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===Socio-economic policy===
The Uribe administration has continued dealing with the [[IMF]] and the [[World Bank]], securing loans, agreeing to cut expenses, agreeing to continue debt payments, privatize public companies and foment investor confidence, in order to comply with financial orthodoxy. These measures have been successful in reducing inflation and the size of the state's deficit, according to the government and analysts from the previously mentioned international organizations.
The government's High Advisor for Social Policy, [[Juan Lozano]], presented in February [[2005]] some of the administration's socio-economic statistics: an increase of 5 million affiliates to the subsidized health system (3.5 million made in 2004, for a total of 15.4 affiliates), an increase of 2 million Colombians that receive meals and care through the Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) (for a total of 6.6 million in 2004), an increase of 1.7 million education slots in the National Service of Learning (SENA) (for a total of 2.7 million in 2004), an increase of 157% in the amount of microcredits available to small entrepreneurs, a reduction of unemployment from 15.6% in [[December]] [[2002]] to 12.1% by [[December]] [[2004]], the addition of almost 200.000 new houses to existing housing projects for the poor, a total of 750.000 new school slots in primary and high school, some 260.000 new university slots, the return of 70.000 displaced persons to their homes (under a 800% increase in the budget assigned to this matter), and support for program that seeks to increase economic subsidies from 170.000 to 570.000 of the elderly by the end of the term.
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[http://www.embajada-colombia.de/paginas/noticias_home/c_noticia44_home.htm] [http://www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/news/breaking_news/11022391.htm]
Companies such as Carbocol, Telecom, Bancafé, Minercol and others, which were either already in crisis or considered by the government as overly expensive to maintain under their current spending conditions, were among those restructured or privatized.
Uribe's administration has been considered as [[neoliberal]] by most direct critics, which argue that it has not addressed the root causes of poverty and unemployment, because continued application of traditional trade and tax policies tend to benefit private and foreign investors over small owners and workers. It is claimed by union and labor groups that many of the privatizations and liquidations have been done to please the [[IMF]], the [[World Bank]] and multinational companies, and would end up hurting several national industries in the long run.[http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/action48.htm] Supporters of Uribe counter these claims by pointing to the rising per capita GDP, fast and sustainable economic growth, low inflation, rising wages, lower public debt, lower unemployment and increased social expenditures of Uribe's government.
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congressional modification and judicial review. Some of the aspects that were removed during the discussions included the possibility of revoking Congress and the option of voting "Yes" or "No" as a whole.
The proposal as implemented was defeated at the polls on [[October 25]] [[2003]], and several leftwing candidates that expressed opposition gained electoral victories at the regional elections that took place the next day.
At least 25% of the electorate needed to participate in each of the referendum's 15 proposals in order for each individual result to be considered valid, but actual overall participation was only of 24.8% and only the first proposal ("political death for the corrupt") was able to achieve this (though all proposals were approved by a substantial majority of those that did vote). [http://www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/colombia_ref03.htm][http://www.registraduria.gov.co/2003RE_escrut/e/vre0.htm?1]
Analysts considered that the combination of these two events evidenced a political setback for Uribe, as one of his main campaign propositions had failed, despite the president's personal leadership. The "active abstention" and blank voting campaigns that his opponents, in particular the [[Independent Democratic Pole]] and the [[Colombian Liberal Party]], had promoted were allegedly successful in convincing enough of their sympathizers to stay home and instead participate in the next day's round of elections. [http://www.registraduria.gov.co/2003CC/]
A number of Uribe's own supporters didn't participate either, as they found the referendum, which had been modified by Congress and later by the Judicial branch, to be too complex, long and uninspiring. Some also pointed out that extraordinary electoral initiatives (in other words, those voted independently outside standard electoral dates) have traditionally suffered complications in Colombia, including a lack of participation.
In [[September]] [[2003]], president Uribe had issued a speech that contained allegations against what he claims are "agents of terrorism" inside a minority of human rights organizations, while at the same time declaring that he respects criticism from most other established organizations and sources. Similar statements were later repeated in other instances. [http://ciponline.org/colombia/030908urib.htm]
These statements have been sharply criticized both inside and outside Colombia because they could potentially endanger the work of human rights and opposition figures. [http://ciponline.org/colombia/ngos.htm] In light of this stance and his family's background as wealthy cattle ranchers, critics have made allegations of his past ties to narcotics traffickers and paramilitaries.
Also in 2003, contacts begun during the previous year with the paramilitary [[Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia|AUC]] forces and their leader [[Carlos Castaño Gil]], which had publicly expressed their will to declare a cease-fire, continued amid a degree of national and international controversy around the matter.
''See also: [[Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia#2003-2004: Initial negotiation efforts| 2003-2004: Initial negotiation efforts]]''
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===Reelection proposal===
{{current}}
In [[2004]], Uribe successfully sought a Congressional amendment to the [[Constitution of Colombia|Colombian Constitution]] which, after being reviewed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, would allow him to run for a second term as president (the Constitution of 1991 only allowed for one presidential term).
Uribe originally had expressed his disagreement with consecutive reelection during his campaign, but later changed his mind, first at a private level and later during public appearances.
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The year [[2005]] established itself as an electoral year, as both president Uribe and Colombia's congressmen began to set their sights on next year's round of elections (to be held in [[May]] and [[March]] [[2006]], respectively).
The FARC, which had been perceived as relatively passive by some, began to show signs of what analysts considered as renewed vigor during the month of February, through a series of attacks against small units of the Colombian military, which left at least three dozen casualties. Uribe stated in a speech that the FARC remain strong and had never retreated, while crediting Colombia's soldiers for their efforts in producing previous successes against their activities. He also stated that he considers the FARC to be cowards, because of their hurting civilian targets during their ambushes. [http://www.excelsior.com.mx/index.php?tim=23-2-2005&ID=12466]
There was also growing public anxiety regarding the negotiations with the [[Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia|AUC]], due to the persisting discussions regarding the specifics of the legal provisions to adequately address the requirements of "justice, reparation and truth" that any full demobilization of the paramilitaries would imply. That the AUC's cease-fire, according to many observers, had not been fully effective and that paramilitary activity continued (albeit at a reduced rate) also was a cause for increasing concern in Colombian and international circles.
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===Early political controversy===
Critics of Álvaro Uribe that have investigated his background have opined that his father was murdered by the FARC in [[1983]] in part because of his personal relations with [[Fabio Ochoa Restrepo]], a known drug lord and eventual supporter of [[paramilitary]] groups. Some have suggested that Uribe's father also collaborated in these activities. Uribe himself and most of his supporters have denied any direct involvement with the drug trade, but allegedly they have not specifically addressed the nature of any previous relationship to the Ochoas and their associates.
His critics also claim that during Uribe's years as director of the Civil Aviation he did nothing to prevent drug dealers from acquiring licenses for the operation of airstrips and drug flights, and may have intentionally allowed them to do so. His supporters claim that actively preventing and prosecuting those activities was outside of his office's jurisdiction and was the responsibility of official law enforcement authorities.
Another frequent claim made by critics is that he was a personal friend of [[Pablo Escobar]] during his years as mayor of Medellín and as a congressional senator. Some of the critics also point out that he may have been involved in the drug business of the former, mainly through the reception of funds and passivity towards his activities, an accusation which has been strongly denied by Uribe himself, though he has yet to directly deny the apparent existence of a personal relationship between the two.
Other observers and his supporters would note that in his previous political positions during the 1980s and 1990s, including as mayor of Medellín, state senator, and governor of Antioquia, a limited passive acquaintance with the narcotics cartels would have been unavoidable for any politician who wished to actually govern without facing the consequences of cartel backlash: death, kidnapping or exile. It is also argued that allegations that senator Uribe fought against the extradition of drug traffickers should be taken in context - for numerous politicians argued that a partially conciliatory stance toward the immensely powerful cartels was necessary during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Uribe himself has claimed that he never argued against extradition per se, but was in favor of postponing a decision on the matter until after the next national elections in 1990, in order to limit any possible interference from the drug lords. Official statements from the president's office have subsequently stated that this position is available for consultation in the congressional archives for [[1989]] and in press reports.
''See also: [[Alleged 1991 drug business involvement of Álvaro Uribe]]''
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* [[Perang Narkoba]]
* [[Konflik bersenjata Kolombia]]
Pada Februari 2006 Kolombia menandatangani Perjanjian TLC dengan AS.
== Pranala luar ==
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Vélez, Alvaro Uribe}}
[[Kategori:Kelahiran 1952]]
[[Kategori:Presiden Kolombia]]
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